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Older adults and sarcasm 
 
Older adults have difficulty in decoding sarcasm.  
Younger and older adults differ in performance on a range of social cognitive skills, with older 
adults having difficulties in decoding nonverbal cues to emotion and intentions. Such skills are likely to 
be important when deciding whether someone is being sarcastic.  In the current study we investigated 
in a lifespan sample whether there are age-related differences in the interpretation of sarcastic 
statements.  Using both video and verbal materials, 116 participants aged between 18 and 86 
completed judgments about whether statements should be interpreted literally or sarcastically. For the 
verbal stories task, older adults were poorer at understanding sarcastic intent compared to younger and 
middle-aged participants, but there was no age difference in interpreting control stories. For the video 
task, older adults showed poorer understanding of sarcastic exchanges compared to younger and 
middle-aged counterparts, but there was no age difference in understanding the meaning of sincere 
interactions. For the videos task, the age differences were mediated by the ability to perceive facial 
expressions of emotion. Age effects could not be explained in terms of variance in working memory. 
These results indicate that increased age is associated with specific difficulties in using nonverbal and 
contextual cues to understand sarcastic intent. 
 
Keywords:  LIFESPAN DEVELOPMENT, AGING, EMOTION PERCEPTION, THEORY OF MIND, SOCIAL 
DECODING. 




Older adults and sarcasm 
 
In contrast to early reports of preserved or improved ability to decode social cues across the 
lifespan (e.g. Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998), older adults have difficulty with many aspects of social 
cue decoding (for a review see Phillips, Slessor, Bailey & Henry, 2014). For example, there are age-
related declines in perceiving emotional cues from faces, voices and body movements (Mill, Allik, Realo 
& Valk, 2009; Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone & Phillips, 2008), indicating that interpersonal affect is more 
difficult to decode in old age. Also , there are age-related declines in understanding the beliefs and  
intentions of other people, as conveyed by their speech, gestures or facial expression (for a meta-
analysis of age differences in these different aspects of ‘theory of mind’ see Henry, Phillips, Ruffman & 
Bailey, 2013).  
In everyday interaction, people draw conclusions about the intentions and emotions of others 
based on a range of cues such as facial expression, bodily movement and the tone or content of speech. 
Sometimes the only way to accurately interpret someone's mental state is to go beyond the literal 
meaning of what they say, and use paralinguistic and contextual cues to decipher their true intention. 
Literal meaning and true intentions may conflict when a speaker is using humor, being sarcastic, or 
attempting to deceive. Research indicates that older adults sometimes have difficulty in understanding 
non-literal statements. For example, there are age differences in appreciation of some types of humor 
(Uekermann, Channon & Daum, 2006) and interpreting cues to deception (Ruffman, Murray, 
Halberstadt & Vater, 2012; Stanley & Blanchard-Fields, 2008). Older adults have also been reported to 
have problems in interpreting non-literal statements such as proverbs or metaphors (e.g. Uekermann, 
Thoma & Daum, 2008). However, some evidence indicates that there may be no age differences in 
interpreting metaphors (Champagne, Jean-Louis & Joannette, 2006), or indeed age-related 
improvements in detecting lies (Bond, Thompson & Malloy, 2005).  
A common type of non-literal statement occurs when a speaker is using sarcasm. Sarcasm is 
present when remarks are made with an underlying negative intent but there is a discrepancy with the 
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literal meaning or context (e.g. Dews et al., 1996). For example, if a colleague habitually arrives late for 
meetings and turns up late once again, someone waiting might look at their watch and say ‘Good to see 
you are on time as usual’. The literal meaning of sarcastic remarks is often positive, but context, tone of 
voice and exaggerated gestures often convey that the intended meaning is in fact the opposite. 
Understanding the intention of a speaker who is being sarcastic requires the ability to interpret 
pragmatic cues (i.e. those cues which come from the social context), and suppress the literal meaning of 
what is said. To date there has been little research investigating the effects of normal aging on the 
ability to interpret cues to sarcasm, and this issue is addressed in the current research. 
It is important to note that sarcasm is not intended to be deceptive – the speaker uses the conflict 
between context and meaning or the exaggerated paralinguistic cues to flag to the listener that they are 
being sarcastic. The same types of facial and bodily cues which are important in interpreting emotions 
are likely to be important in detecting sarcasm. More complex theory of mind skills involved in 
understanding mental states are also expected to be important in decoding the meaning of non-literal 
statements (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, & Aharon-Peretz, 2005). For example, in order to detect that the 
meaning of a statement is sarcastic rather than literal, it may be necessary to understand the knowledge 
of the people involved in the interaction, and the intention of the person making the statement.   
Older adults perform poorly on many theory of mind tasks (Henry et al., 2013) and this has been 
linked to lower integrity of white matter pathways in the brain (Charlton, Barrick, Markus & Morris, 
2009). Parallels have been drawn (e.g. Ruffman et al., 2008; Slessor, Phillips & Bull, 2008) between older 
adults’ performance on  social decoding tasks and that shown by other populations whose cortical-
subcortical white matter connectivity is compromised.  The ability to decode sarcasm is impaired 
following frontal lobe brain injury (Channon et al., 2007), and in frontotemporal dementia (Kipps, 
Nestor, Acosta-Cabronero, Arnold  &  Hodges, 2009). Given age-related reductions in integrity of frontal 
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white matter connectivity (e.g. Charlton et al., 2009) it can therefore be predicted that older adults may 
show problems in interpreting sarcastic statements. 
If there are age-related changes in the comprehension of sarcasm, it is of interest to explore 
whether this relates to emotion perception and theory of mind. The ability to detect and interpret 
sarcasm has been found to relate to emotion recognition in people with brain injury (Shamay-Tsoory et 
al., 2005), and dementia (Kipps et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2009; Shanay-Ur et al., 2011). There is also 
evidence that theory of mind abilities are related to sarcasm comprehension in brain injured samples 
(e.g. McDonald & Flanagan, 2004; Channon, Pellijeff & Rule, 2005; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005; Winner, 
Brownell, Happé, Blum & Pincus, 1998). Given that there are well-established age-related declines in 
understanding expressions of emotion (Ruffman et al., 2008) and theory of mind skills (Henry et al., 
2013) it is of interest to explore whether any age differences in sarcasm comprehension are related to 
these other key social cognitive skills. Indeed, there is evidence that age-related problems in 
understanding social appropriateness and deception may be partially mediated by difficulties with 
emotion perception (Halberstadt, Ruffman, Murray, Taumoepeau, & Ryan, 2011; Ruffman, et al., 2012; 
Stanley & Blanchard-Fields, 2008).  
Another important factor in any age effects on sarcasm comprehension might be cognitive 
changes. Dual task studies indicate that decoding protagonists’ emotions and intentions places demands 
on working memory (Phillips, Channon, Tunstall, Hedenstrom & Lyons 2008; Bull, Phillips & Conway, 
2008). To understand sarcasm, others’ intentions and emotions must be understood, maintained and 
updated, while also placing statements in the context of the on-going situation and weighing up possible 
literal and non-literal interpretations of meaning. It therefore seems plausible that working memory 
updating is important in sarcasm comprehension, and might be associated with any age differences 
found. One way in which we explore this issue in the current study is through the use of matched 
control conditions for the sarcasm tasks which have similar perceptual and cognitive load but do not 
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require the understanding of non-literal statements. A further way of addressing this issue is by taking a 
separate measurement of working memory updating to explore its relationship to age differences in 
sarcasm understanding.  
As well as factors such as problems with emotion perception or working memory updating, there 
might be other reasons that older and younger people differ in their interpretation of sarcasm. Sarcastic 
statements usually contain some negative intent, and older adults are known to show positivity biases in 
their interpretation of social information (for a review see Reed, Chan & Mikels, 2014). For example 
older adults are more likely to disengage from negative personal comments (Charles & Carstensen, 
2008), and to have positive responses to a negative social situation (Luong & Charles, 2014). It is 
possible, therefore, that positivity biases in old age might results in older adults being less likely to 
attribute sarcastic intent to another. 
Aging may also differentially relate to the interpretation of different types of sarcasm. There are a 
number of ways in which sarcastic intent can be communicated. For example, sarcasm can be conveyed 
by the tone of voice and other paralinguistic cues such as facial expressions and exaggerated gestures 
(Rankin et al., 2009). McDonald, Flanagan and Rollins (2002) refer to this as simple sarcasm. To decode 
simple sarcasm it is necessary to pick up the relevant paralinguistic cues. In contrast, paradoxical 
sarcasm occurs when a statement can only make sense when interpreted non-literally. For example, in 
one scenario in McDonald et al.’s stimuli, a character says, “Are you sure you’ve got your passport?”, to 
which another responds, “Oh, yes, I tore it up and threw it away”. Here the meaning of the interchange 
is nonsensical unless interpreted as sarcastic. As the simple sarcasm scenarios involve interpretation of 
paralinguistic cues while paradoxical sarcasm scenarios do not, it can be argued that the simple sarcasm 
items could be more sensitive to problems with nonverbal cue decoding.  
Direct sarcasm can also be distinguished from indirect sarcasm (Bucciarelli, Colle, & Bara, 2003). 
Direct sarcasm is where the sarcastic statement is a reversal of the actual meaning, for example (from 
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Channon et al., 2005): after seeing a terrible play someone says, ‘That was a fantastic play you took me 
to see’. Indirect sarcasm is more subtle and does not convey the exact opposite of the literal meaning, 
for example: after beating a friend at tennis someone says, ‘I suppose you’ll say there is a hole in your 
racquet?’ The literal meaning is not intended, but in this case the sarcasm is more nuanced. The 
understanding of direct sarcasm develops earlier in childhood than indirect sarcasm (Dews et al., 1996), 
suggesting that interpreting indirect sarcastic statements requires more mature cognitive and/or social 
skills. However Channon et al. (2007) found that people with frontal lobe injuries were equally impaired 
in decoding direct and indirect sarcastic statements.  
In the current study we looked at the effects of lifespan aging on the comprehension of sarcasm in 
both stories and videos. Sarcasm can be conveyed in text through the mismatch between social context 
and literal speech meaning. The comprehension of sarcasm from stories is likely to be dependent on 
understanding this mismatch. In videos, a range of contextual and paralinguistic cues to intent (such as 
body language, tone of voice, facial expression) can be used to portray sarcasm. It was of interest to use 
both modalities as there is some evidence that age effects on other social decoding skills in standard 
theory of mind tasks can vary depending on the modality of presentation (Slessor, Phillips & Bull, 2007). 
Also, using two different modalities allows us to understand whether the pattern of age effects seen 
generalizes across tasks which differ considerably in perceptual and attentional demands.  
Predictions and hypotheses 
Understanding sarcastic statements requires decoding of emotional cues and underlying 
intentions in order to make non-literal interpretations of speech. As older adults have been shown to 
have problems with emotion perception (Ruffman et al., 2008), understanding intentions (Henry et al., 
2013) and non-literal interpretations (Uekermann et al., 2008), we predicted that older adults would 
have difficulties in sarcasm comprehension. Given previous evidence of specific age-related declines on 
social cognitive skills compared to non-social control tasks (e.g. Phillips et al., 2011; Sullivan & Ruffman, 
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2004), we predicted that older adults would be impaired in comprehending sarcasm to a greater extent 
than control tasks matched for cognitive demands but not involving sarcastic intent. We also explored 
the effects of age across the lifespan. Because most studies of age effects on social decoding use an 
extreme age groups design, there is relatively little evidence to evaluate whether social cognitive skills 
continue to mature into middle age, or instead begin to decline early in adulthood. Perception of basic 
emotions such as anger and sadness may show age-related declines quite early in adulthood, with 
middle-aged adults performing worse than young (Issacowitz et al., 2007; Mill et al., 2009). In contrast, 
the ability to decide between more complex emotion labels for pictures of eyes is maintained through 
middle-age, only showing declines after age 60 (Hartshorne & Germine, 2015). Understanding sarcasm is 
a relatively complex social cognition task, so might be preserved into middle-age. Our first hypothesis 
was therefore that older adults would show specific impairments in the comprehension of sarcasm 
compared to younger and middle-aged counterparts. 
As outlined above, there are different ways to convey sarcasm which may influence the cognitive 
and social perceptual load of understanding sarcastic intent. For example, paradoxical sarcasm is 
signaled via a clear mismatch between the content of speech and reality, while simple sarcasm depends 
more on picking up nonverbal cues to emotions and intentions (McDonald & Flanagan, 2004). It can 
therefore be predicted that age differences would be greater on simple sarcasm, which depends mainly 
on decoding nonverbal cues to emotions and intentions, as compared to paradoxical sarcasm where 
there are more contextual cues to aid understanding of sarcastic intent. We explored this through the 
use of videos (McDonald et al., 2002) which showed both paradoxical and simple sarcasm. Also, it has 
been argued that interpretation of direct sarcasm (where meaning is directly reversed) involves fewer 
cognitive resources than understanding indirect sarcasm (where meaning is more subtly ironic: 
Bucciarelli et al., 2003). Age differences may therefore be greater for interpreting indirectly sarcastic 
statements than more direct ones, because the former more heavily loads cognitive resources. We 
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tested this using variants of the written sarcasm stories described by Channon et al. (2007). Our second 
hypothesis was therefore that age differences would be greater in interpreting simple (compared to 
paradoxical) and indirect (compared to direct) sarcasm.  
The ability to understand sarcasm is dependent on both emotion perception skills such as picking 
up affective cues from faces, voices and gestures and theory of mind skills to decode others’ intentions.  
Previous studies indicate that problems with theory of mind and emotion perception are related to the 
ability to interpret sarcasm (e.g. Channon et al., 2005). Older adults have impairments in emotion 
perception and theory of mind, so these social cognitive skills might be important in determining any 
problems in sarcasm comprehension. We will therefore investigate the relationships between these 
variables.  Previous studies indicate that emotion perception partially mediated age differences in other 
aspects of social judgment such as social gaffes and deceit detection (Halberstadt, et al., 2011; Ruffman, 
et al., 2012) as well as false belief reasoning (Phillips et al., 2011). We will follow up these results by 
exploring whether emotion perception specifically predicts age differences in sarcasm decoding.  Our 
third hypothesis was that age differences in sarcasm comprehension would be mediated by problems 
with emotion perception and theory of mind.  
We also explored the potential role of cognitive and emotional changes in old age. Given that on-
line processing of emotions and intentions is likely to depend on working memory updating (e.g. Phillips 
et al., 2008), we tested whether age-related differences in sarcasm comprehension might be mediated 
by variance in working memory updating. Finally, given the importance of positivity biases in influencing 
social judgments in old age (Charles & Carstensen, 2008) we looked at whether any age differences in 
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116 participants completed the tasks: 40 young adults aged between 18 and 39 (27 females), 40 
middle-aged adults aged between 40 and 64 (21 females) and 36 older adults aged between 65 and 86 
(19 females). Participants were recruited from local contacts and groups, and through the University 
community, and were given a small payment for the testing session. Participants reported that they had 
no current neurological or psychiatric illness. Older adults also completed the MMSE test (Folstein, 
Folstein & McHugh, 1975). All scored above 26 (range 27-30, M = 28.77, SD = 1.09), which is the 
suggested cut-off for possible dementia in a well-educated sample (Mitchell, 2009). Descriptive statistics 
for age differences in years of education, Mill Hill vocabulary scores (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) and 
health self-ratings on a scale of 1-9 are shown in Table 1.The three age groups differed in years of 
education, F (2, 113) = 6.21, p < .01, ηp2 = .10, with Bonferroni tests revealing that older adults had fewer 
years of education than young or middle-aged participants. There were also age differences in 
performance on the Mill Hill vocabulary test, F (2, 113) = 17.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, with middle-aged and 
older adults both performing better than younger adults. The three age groups did not differ in self-
rated health, F (2, 113) = 1.13, ηp2 = .02. 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The tasks below were presented in one of two counterbalanced orders, as part of a larger battery 
of cognitive and emotional tasks. The testing session lasted for approximately two hours. 
Understanding sarcasm from videos. 
Participants completed the Social Inference – Minimal subtest of The Awareness of Social 
Inference Test (TASIT, McDonald et al., 2002). This test consists of 15 videos of acted social interactions 
between 20-60s long, in which five sincere, five simple sarcasm and five paradoxical sarcasm exchanges 
are shown. Four questions are presented after each video, which ask for specific details about what one 
of the people in the video was doing, thinking and feeling, and what meaning they were trying to 
communicate to the other person.  For example, in one simple sarcasm video a woman is busily doing a 
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domestic task while a man reads a book and she says (sarcastically) ‘Are you busy – I know you’ve got a 
lot on?’ Participants are asked to answer yes or no to the following questions (correct answer in 
brackets): A. Is she is trying to pressure him into helping her? (yes);  B.Is she trying to say it’s OK if he 
doesn’t help? (no); C. Does she think he should help her?(yes); D. Is she annoyed with him? (yes).  In 
both sincere and simple sarcasm vignettes the meaning of the script is neutral so that paralinguistic cues 
must be used in order to interpret the meaning. In the paradoxical sarcasm videos the meaning only 
makes sense if interpreted as sarcastic, so there are semantic cues to non-literal meaning. Performance 
was scored by adding together the scores for the four questions for each video.  For each condition 
(sincere, simple sarcasm, paradoxical sarcasm) the maximum total score was therefore 20. These scores 
were converted into percentage correct. For each question, response time was also recorded, but these 
were not further analyzed. 
Understanding sarcasm from stories. 
The stories used were adapted from Channon et al. (2007). There were ten sarcastic stories, five 
of which involved direct sarcasm and five indirect sarcasm. There were also ten control stories which did 
not involve any sarcasm. Five of these involved the attribution of some kind of mental state to a 
protagonist, while five involved a physical event. Examples of each story type are given in Appendix 1. 
For each of the vignettes, the text was presented sentence by sentence on a computer screen. 
Participants could look at each sentence as long as they wished, and then pressed a button to progress 
to the next. Each story involved six sentences, and the stories in the different categories were matched 
for length. We presented the information in this way in order to more closely match the way in which 
social information is processed in everyday life (i.e. online and without the ability to keep referring back 
to previous information). Moreover, pilot work revealed that performance on the task was close to 
ceiling in both young and older adults if full stories were presented with questions below.  
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After presentation of each final sentence participants were asked a question about what 
happened in the story, with four multiple choice answers to choose from. For example, in a direct 
sarcasm story about a woman taking her friend (Jean) to see a play which turned out to be not very 
good, Jean said "That was a fantastic play you took me to see!" The question was:  What did Jean mean 
when she said that? Possible answers to choose from were:  (a) That play was terrible (correct answer); 
(b) That was a very good play; (c) Next time I'll check what the critics say; (d) That was a beautiful 
theatre. Participants were told that more than one answer might appear correct, but that they should 
choose the best response which most fully answered the question. Reaction times to each screen 
presentation were recorded, but are not further analyzed here. 
Sarcasm stories involved questions about the meaning of a protagonist’s statement, while mental 
state control stories involved understanding other aspects of the mental state of a protagonist. Physical 
control stories asked about why a particular event had occurred and did not require any mental state 
attribution. Performance for each type of story was scored in terms of percentage accuracy. Participants 
were asked a further memory question about each story, but performance on this measure was close to 
ceiling, and did not differ across the age groups. 
Measure of Emotion Perception:  Dynamic Faces task. 
In order to assess emotion perception skills, photographs from the Facial Emotion Expression 
Stimuli and Test (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer & Ekman, 2002) were used. Photographs 
depicting each of the six basic emotions from the stimulus set were used to create dynamic stimuli. 
Dynamic stimuli were used as these more accurately resemble the way in which emotions are 
experienced in everyday life, when expressions develop across time and are often fleeting (Ambadar, 
Schooler & Cohn, 2005). For each face, dynamic stimuli were prepared which blended photographs of 
neutral, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% emotional intensity into a 6s animation. Each video began with a 
neutral face, and then developed to a maximum emotional intensity and then returned to neutral again. 
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There were 72 videos (twelve for each of the six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, surprise), and during each video the participant was presented with a list of the possible 
response options from which they had to choose a label.  
Measure of Theory of Mind: the Faux Pas task. 
In order to assess theory of mind skills the Faux Pas task was used (Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 
1998). This task required participants to identify whether or not a person described in a verbal vignette 
had committed a social faux pas. This requires the understanding and application of social rules in order 
to decide whether a statement is inappropriate and violates a social norm. Good task performance 
requires that participants simultaneously understand the mental states of two protagonists: the person 
making the faux pas who does not realize they have said the wrong thing, and also the listener whose 
feelings are being hurt (Stone et al., 1998). We used this measure to assess theory of mind because we 
wanted a task which was (a) verbal and (b) demanded understanding of intentions and emotions in a 
social context. Given that we have both verbal and visual sarcasm tasks, it was important to look at both 
verbal (theory of mind) and visual (emotion perception) potential mediators. When deciding which 
verbal theory of mind task to use we considered the most widely used adult test (variants of the Strange 
Stories test, e.g. Happé et al., 1998). However this task contains multiple items assessing understanding 
of non-literal meanings (including sarcasm, deception and white lies) so we felt it was too conceptually 
close to our sarcasm measures to be a more general measure of theory of mind in this case. Measures of 
faux pas understanding have been successfully used to assess theory of mind in adult aging studies (e.g. 
Halberstadt, et al. 2011; MacPherson , Phillips & Della Sala, 2002). 
Participants read a series of short stories, 10 of which contained a faux pas and 10 control stories 
that did not. Each story was presented in full on a computer screen and participants could spend as long 
reading the story as they wished. The story was followed by an initial faux pas detection question which 
asked whether someone in the story said something they should not have said. If participants responded 
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‘yes’ to this question they were asked three further questions: Who said something inappropriate? Why 
was it inappropriate? Why did they say it? The accuracy of faux pas understanding was calculated by 
looking at responses to the initial faux pas question for each of the twenty stories, summing the ‘yes’ 
answers to faux pas stories and ‘no’ answers to control questions (maximum score = 20). The accuracy 
of mental state understanding was calculated by adding together correct answers for each of the faux 
pas stories on the three further questions asking about who and why (maximum score = 30). An overall 
score on the test was calculated by adding together the detection and mental state understanding 
scores and converting the resulting score (out of 50) into percentage accuracy.  
Measure of working memory: the n-back task. 
The N-back task was adapted from Braver et al. (1997) to investigate a participant’s ability to 
update and monitor information in working memory. This task involved the presentation of a sequence 
of numbers (ranging from 1 to 9) individually in the center of the screen. During a 1-back practice block 
of trials, participants had to monitor stimuli and decide whether the presented number was the same as 
the number that had been presented immediately before by pressing one of two keys labeled ‘yes’ and 
‘no’ on a response box. The 2-back updating condition consisted of 38 trials where participants had to 
report whether the number presented was the same as the number before the last (presented 2 trials 
before it) by pressing either a yes or no key. Each stimulus remained on screen until the participant had 
made a response. This was then followed by an inter-stimulus interval of 800ms. Percentage accuracy on 
the 2-back condition was used as the dependent measure in the current study. Note that 31 of the 
young, 38 of the middle-aged and 33 of the older adults completed the N-back task. 
Measure of current emotion. 
We used the 10-item short Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark & 
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In order to test the hypothesis that age differences would be greater on understanding sarcastic 
compared to sincere exchanges separate ANOVAs were carried out for video and story tasks. These 
analyses also tested the hypothesis that age effects would be greater for simple (compared to 
paradoxical) sarcasm for the video task, and indirect (compared to direct) sarcasm for the stories task.  
Videos of sincere and sarcastic exchanges 
The effects of age and video type were explored with a 3 (age group) x 3 video type (sincere, 
simple sarcasm, paradoxical sarcasm) mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA). Age was a between-
subjects factor and video type was a within-subjects factor, and the dependent variable was accuracy of 
performance on the sarcasm task. There was a significant effect of group, F (2, 113) = 10.71, p < .001, ηp2 
= .16. Bonferroni tests with p < .05 revealed that older adults (M = 79.72) were less accurate than both 
young (M = 86.42) and middle-aged participants (M = 89.54). There was an effect of video type, F (2, 
226) = 13.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, and paired-samples t-tests revealed that performance on paradoxical 
sarcasm was higher (M = 90.04) than on sincere (M = 81.55) or simple sarcasm videos (M = 84.66). There 
was also an interaction between age group and type of video, F (4, 226) = 2.79, p < .05, ηp2 = .05, see 
Figure 1. The interaction was explored through pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment. For 
the sincere videos, there was no effect of age. For the simple sarcasm videos, there were significant age 
effects, with younger (p < .01) and middle-aged (p < .001) participants outperforming older adults. Also 
for the paradoxical sarcasm videos younger (p < .05) and middle-aged participants (p < .001) 
outperformed older adults. These results support the hypothesis that older adults would have difficulty 
in interpreting sarcastic, but not sincere exchanges. 
To check whether the age differences in interpreting sarcasm were greater for simple compared 
to paradoxical sarcasm a separate 3 x 2 ANOVA was carried out looking at the effects of age group and 
sarcastic video type (simple v paradoxical). There was no interaction between age group and sarcasm 
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type, F (1, 112) = 1.58, p = .21, ηp2 = .03. This does not support the hypothesis of greater age differences 
on the simple sarcasm videos. 
Control and sarcasm stories 
The effects of age and story type were explored with a 3 (age group) x 4 story type (direct 
sarcasm, indirect sarcasm, mental control, physical control) mixed design ANOVA. Age was a between-
subjects factor and story type was a within-subjects factor, and the dependent variable was accuracy of 
performance on the sarcasm task. There was a significant effect of group, F (2, 113) = 6.94, p = .001, ηp2 
= .11. Bonferroni tests revealed that older adults (M = 90.56) were less accurate than both young (M = 
94.50) and middle-aged participants (M = 95.50). There was an effect of story type, F (3, 339) = 21.30, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .16, with performance on the physical control items (M = 98.21) higher than on indirect 
sarcasm (M = 95.41), which in turn was performed better than both mental control (M = 91.55) and 
direct sarcasm stories (M = 88.91). There was also an interaction between age group and type of story, F 
(6, 339) = 3.75, p < .01, ηp2 = 06, see Figure 2. To explore that interaction further, pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferroni adjustment were carried out. There was no effect of age group on either mental or 
physical control stories. For the direct sarcasm stories young (p < .01) and middle-aged participants (p < 
.05) outperformed old. For the indirect sarcasm stories the middle-aged group were significantly better 
than the older group (p < .01), but neither group significantly differed from the young group. These 
results support the prediction that older adults would have difficulty in interpreting sarcastic but not 
control stories. 
To check whether the age differences in interpreting sarcasm were greater for indirect compared 
to direct sarcasm a separate 3 x 2 ANOVA was carried out looking at the effects of age group and 
sarcasm story type (direct v indirect). There was no interaction between age group and sarcasm type, F 
(1, 112) = 2.29, p = .11, ηp2 = .04. This does not support the hypothesis that age effects would be greater 
for the indirect sarcasm stories. 
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The possible role of emotion perception, theory of mind and working memory. 
The next set of analyses tested the hypothesis that other key measures might mediate the effects 
of age on sarcasm comprehension. First, age effects in these proposed mediators (emotion perception, 
theory of mind and working memory) were assessed, and second, correlations between the proposed 
mediators and sarcasm comprehension were explored. Where both age effects and correlations 
between the mediator and sarcasm were significant, mediation models were tested.  
Table 2 describes age group differences in emotion perception (EP), theory of mind (ToM), 
working memory (2-back) and current affect (PANAS).  One-way ANOVAs revealed a significant age 
group effect on EP, F (2, 112) = 8.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .12, with Bonferroni tests showing that the older 
group performed worse than young (p < .01) and middle-aged (p < .001).  There was no age group effect 
on ToM performance, F (2,112) = 2.34, p = .10, ηp2 = .04. A significant age group difference in 2-back 
working memory (WM) performance, F (2, 101) = 5.12, p < .01, ηp2 = .13, was due to the older group 
performing worse than the young (p < .001). Older adults had lower levels of negative affect than both 
younger (p < .001) and middle-aged counterparts (p < .01), F (2, 101) = 9.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Age 
differences in positive affect, F (2, 101) = 4.79, p < .05, ηp2 = .09, were due to older adult having higher 
levels of positive affect than middle-aged adults (p < .01). 
Table 2 also shows the correlations between performance on the sarcasm comprehension tasks 
and measures of ToM, EP and WM and current emotion. Note that performance on the different types 
of sarcastic video was combined (simple and paradoxical) as there was no indication of differential age 
effects, and the same applied to the direct and indirect sarcasm stories.  Both ToM and EP were 
correlated with the ability to understand sarcasm from both stories and videos. However, as 
performance on the ToM test was not affected by age it could not be considered as a possible mediator 
for the age-sarcasm relationship. We therefore tested mediation models to explore whether EP might 
statistically mediate shared variance between age and sarcasm understanding from (1) videos and (2) 
17 
 
Older adults and sarcasm 
 
stories. WM performance measured by the 2-back task did not correlate with sarcasm comprehension 
from the videos, while the correlation approached significance for the story task. We therefore tested a 
third mediation model to explore whether WM might mediate shared variance between age and the 
stories sarcasm task. There were no significant correlations between measures of current positive or 
negative affect and sarcasm comprehension. 
Mediation analyses were carried out following the methods outlined by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004, 2008). In mediation analysis a series of regressions are carried out to test whether the association 
between the predictor variable (age group) and the dependent variable (sarcasm comprehension) is 
significantly mediated by a third variable (in this case EP or WM). An initial regression examines the 
relationship between the predictor and mediator variable (path a in Figure 3). The second step confirms 
the relationship between the predictor variable and the dependent variable (path c in Figure 3). The 
final regression analysis simultaneously enters the mediator and predictor variables to explain variance 
in the dependent variable (paths b and c’ in Figure 3). Reductions from c to c’, once the mediator is 
entered, suggest a possible mediation effect. The significance of any mediation effect can be tested 
using bootstrap procedures (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008: see http://www.afhayes.com/ for the 
macros used). Note that we used age group and not age in years as a predictor because of non-linear 
relationships between age and sarcasm decoding.  
In the first mediation analysis the influence of EP on age group differences in understanding 
sarcasm from videos was investigated. EP was a significant predictor of sarcasm comprehension when 
entered along with age in the analysis (see Figure 3i). Bootstrapping revealed that emotion perception 
was a significant mediator of the age-sarcasm relationship (bias corrected confidence intervals with 
5000 resamples from -2.600 to -0.029, do not include zero, p < .05).  Note that this is only a partial 
mediation effect as the age-sarcasm relationship remained significant (see c’ in Figure 3i).  
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In the second mediation analysis (see Figure 3ii) the influence of EP on age group differences in 
understanding sarcasm from stories was tested.  However, EP was not a significant predictor of sarcasm 
comprehension when entered in regression with age (see b in Figure 3ii), and bootstrapping confirmed 
that no mediation effect was present (confidence intervals from -0.621 to 0.367 include zero). These 
results partially support the prediction that emotion perception would mediate age differences in 
sarcasm comprehension: the mediation effects were found only in the videos task. 
A final analysis looked at whether age differences in decoding sarcasm from stories might be 
mediated by WM scores from the 2-back task (see Figure 4). WM was not a significant predictor of 
sarcasm comprehension when entered in regression with age, and bootstrapping confirmed that no 
mediation effect was present (confidence intervals from -1.199 to 0.330 include zero). This result does 
not support the idea that working memory problems mediate age differences in sarcasm understanding. 
Discussion 
The pattern of age differences in understanding sarcasm 
In line with other social cognition differences across the lifespan, this study indicated that older 
adults were less likely to understand sarcasm from both story and video stimuli. Most aging studies of 
social cognitive skills employ an extreme groups design, but the current study recruited a lifespan adult 
sample including a middle-aged group. Supporting previous findings on mental belief reasoning skills 
(Phillips et al., 2011) the middle-aged group in the current study performed similarly to the younger 
group. While there are relatively early age-related declines in some social perception skills such as basic 
emotion perception (Mill et al., 2009), the current results indicate that more complex social cognitive 
skills such as comprehending sarcastic intent are spared until later in the lifespan. This may reflect 
relatively early age-related change in perceptual mechanisms (which are important in some tasks of 
facial emotion perception) whereas age effects on more complex and context dependent tasks such as 
sarcasm detection or belief reasoning might occur later in the lifespan. However, it should be noted that 
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there was no evidence of the middle-aged group performing worse than the young on the emotion 
perception task in the current study. The trajectory of adult age effects on different aspects of social 
cognition may be highly task-specific, depending on perceptual and cognitive demands, the role of 
wisdom and experience, and social and emotional demands of different task conditions.  
There was clear evidence for specificity of age-related difficulty in understanding sarcasm: no age-
related differences were found in the control conditions for the videos or stories. This concurs with 
previous research on age-related changes in social cognitive tasks, where age differences are greater on 
emotion judgments compared to tasks requiring age or object judgments (Ruffman et al., 2012; Sullivan 
& Ruffman, 2004). A recent meta-analysis of a broad range of theory of mind tasks indicates that age 
differences are greater in mental state decoding than matched control tasks (Henry et al., 2013).  
One aim of this study was to look at the effects of aging on understanding different types of 
sarcasm. In the videos task there were equivalent age effects in interpreting simple sarcasm (which was 
dependent on picking up nonverbal cues to intention), and paradoxical sarcasm (which was more reliant 
on understanding semantic meaning).  While paradoxical sarcasm in these videos is conveyed mainly by 
a mismatch between the situational context and the statement made, inspection of the videos reveals 
that there are also nonverbal cues from facial expression and tone of voice to indicate non-literal intent. 
Performance on the video task indicated that paradoxical sarcasm was understood better than simple 
sarcasm, suggesting that it was easier to interpret: this may reflect the fact there are both contextual 
and nonverbal cues to signal sarcastic intent. One unexpected result was that understanding of the 
sincere videos was at a lower level than the sarcastic videos. A similar result has been reported in other 
healthy control samples (e.g. McDonald et al., 2002). Lower performance on sincere as compared to 
sarcastic videos in the current sample might reflect a bias for participants to suspect non-literal 
meanings, given that the test is comprised of a majority of scenarios where sarcasm is present. It would 
be useful in future to develop stimuli which have a lower frequency of sarcastic statements. 
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Performance on the stories sarcasm task did not support the prediction that age differences 
would be more apparent on indirect than direct sarcasm vignettes: there was not a significant 
interaction between age and type of sarcasm. However paired comparisons revealed a slightly different 
age pattern on direct and indirect sarcasm stories. Older adults performed worse than young and 
middle-aged on the direct sarcasm trials, where a protagonist makes a remark with directly opposite 
meaning to the intention. For the indirect sarcasm stories, where the sarcastic remark was more subtle 
and not the direct opposite of the intended meaning, middle-aged adults performed better than old, but 
the young group did not differ from either. Younger adults may not perform particularly well on these 
specific items because they are of higher social and semantic complexity than the more direct forms of 
sarcasm. Understanding of direct sarcasm develops earlier in childhood than indirect (Dews et al., 1996), 
and it may be that interpreting complex meanings peaks in middle-age. However, this result may be 
confounded by ceiling effects: the middle-aged group performed at 98% accuracy on these trials.  There 
were not significant age differences on either type of control story, and in fact there was a trend for 
older adults to perform better than young on the physical control stories. This indicates that older adults 
were specifically having difficulty in making non-literal interpretations of speech rather than struggling 
to process the verbal material online more generally.  
The role of emotion perception and theory of mind 
We also investigated the potential role of emotion perception and theory of mind in age 
differences in understanding sarcasm. Emotion perception was related to both age and comprehension 
of sarcasm, so mediation analyses were carried out. These indicated that for the video task age 
differences in comprehension of sarcasm were partly mediated by emotion perception. Problems with 
perceiving nonverbal cues such as emotions are important in detecting and understanding non-literal 
intent from speech, and this is more important when visual information is available. The current results 
fit with previous studies indicating the potential importance of emotion perception in decoding sarcastic 
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intent in neurological populations (e.g. Kipps et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2009; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 
2005), as well as findings that detecting lies and social gaffes in old age may be partly mediated by 
poorer emotion perception (Halberstadt et al., 2011; Ruffman et al., 2012.). The finding that emotion 
perception partially mediated age-related variance in another social cognition skill suggests overlap in 
the developmental processes involved in social cognition. Conceptually, this indicates that one of the 
important influences on age-related changes in relatively complex social cognition tasks such as sarcasm 
comprehension may be more basic social perception processes, which are also subject to age-related 
change. However, it should be noted that the emotion perception task used here was not a naturalistic 
task, as it involved manipulation of static faces to produce dynamic clips. It would be useful in future 
research to use real videos which portray the true time course of emotions unfolding, and also to use 
tasks which extend beyond facial expressions to also include tone of voice and bodily gestures.  
Age differences in interpreting sarcasm from stories were not mediated by our current visual 
measure of emotion perception. This contrasts with a previous finding (Phillips et al., 2011) that age 
differences in interpreting false beliefs from both stories and videos were mediated by the ability to 
extract emotional information from whole body stimuli. A different set of both mediator (faces v whole 
bodies) and dependent variables (sarcasm comprehension v false belief reasoning) were used in these 
studies, and it is important for future research to explore in more detail whether age differences in a 
range of social inference tasks relates to multiple aspects of emotion perception.  This will shed some 
more light on the important conceptual issue of how different aspects of social cognition are inter-
dependent, and the extent to which more basic social perception processes are essential for more 
complex social inference.  
While the faux pas test of theory of mind was correlated with sarcasm, there were no effects of 
age on understanding faux pas. Previous studies have reported mixed effects of age on understanding of 
social faux pas, with some reporting no age effect in the accuracy of detection (MacPherson et al.,  
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2002), while others indicate age-related decline (Halberstadt et al., 2011). Stanley, Lohani and Issacowitz 
(2014) report that older adults find faux pas less funny than young and middle-aged adults , while Zhang, 
Fung, Stanley, Issacowitz & Ho (2013) reported that older adults had poorer understanding of faux pas 
only when the experimenter was unknown to the participant. Because there were no age relationships 
with the faux pas task used here we could not further explore whether theory of mind might mediate 
age differences in sarcasm comprehension.  
Cognitive components of understanding sarcasm 
We also tested whether age-related differences in sarcasm comprehension might be mediated by 
declining working memory. There were significant age differences in working memory in our sample, 
and performance on the working memory task was weakly correlated with understanding sarcasm from 
the stories (with p = .057). The relationship between working memory and sarcasm comprehension from 
videos was not significant. A mediation analysis indicated that the age differences in understanding 
sarcasm from stories could not be explained in terms of declining working memory. Working memory is 
therefore unlikely to be the major factor underlying age differences in decoding sarcasm. This contrasts 
with previous findings that age differences in belief reasoning were partially explained by working 
memory updating (Phillips et al., 2011). Despite the sequential nature of both the story and video 
sarcasm measures used in the current study, the requirement to hold in mind contextual information 
and protagonists’ intentions did not seem to overload participants’ working memory systems. 
Conceptually this indicates that age differences in social cognitive skills such as sarcasm comprehension 
are distinct from more traditional cognitive resources.  It should be noted that we only have one (verbal) 
measure of working memory here, and it would be useful in future studies to use a range of memory 
updating tasks. 
While we assessed working memory updating, we did not assess other aspects of executive 
function which might be important in social cognition tasks such as inhibition and switching. In the 
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current tasks, to decide whether a protagonist was being sarcastic required the consideration of both 
literal and non-literal interpretations of a statement. In common with many social cognition tasks (such 
as false belief reasoning or detecting deception), this requires the resolution of discrepant information, 
which might load control processes such as inhibition and switching. Previous studies have produced 
mixed results on whether age differences in the resolution of discrepant belief states are mediated by 
inhibition (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Phillips et al., 2011). This likely reflects difficulties in assessing the 
construct of inhibition (Bailey & Henry, 2008), which is not a unitary construct.  
There are many situations in which social cues are mismatched and so potentially complex to 
resolve. For example older adults have increased difficulties when conflicting emotional cues are 
presented (Hunter, Phillips & MacPherson, 2010). It would be of interest to explore whether different 
channels of information are more dominant as people get older. For example, in the current study, older 
people might rely more on the meaning of what people say rather than placing weight on the contextual 
and pragmatic cues which indicate sarcastic intention. This might occur because of a bias towards literal 
interpretations or increased self-doubt about interpreting emotional cues. Also, awareness of age-
related change in hearing could potentially lead to an increased reliance on visual cues.  
Emotional, social and cultural influences on interpreting sarcasm 
It is important to note that another conceptual interpretation of the age differences in attributing 
sarcastic intention is that they reflect positivity biases in old age (Reed et al., 2014). Older adults are 
more likely to ignore negative social information and reappraise negative situations in a more positive 
light (e.g. Charles & Carstensen, 2008). This might mean that older people are less alert to negative 
intent, such as sarcasm. In our sample older adults reported lower levels of negative affect than young 
and middle-aged participants, and higher levels of positive affect compared to middle-aged. However 
there were no relationships between measures of current affect and performance on any of the sarcasm 
measures.  In order to explore this issue in more detail it would be interesting to directly compare age 
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effects in understanding sarcasm with understanding of more positive intents which also involve non-
literal interpretations. An example might be picking up on ‘white lies’ where the speaker has deceptive 
intent, but with positive motives to spare someone’s feelings.   
Our sample was not matched across the age groups for either vocabulary levels or years of 
education. Additional analyses covarying these factors did not change the results reported above 
concerning age differences. Another factor which could contribute to current findings is generational 
differences in use of (or familiarity with) sarcasm. There is a stereotype that recent generations use 
irony and sarcasm more frequently than previous generations do.  However there is not much empirical 
evidence to determine whether this reflects reality. In contrast to the idea that older adults rarely use 
sarcasm, Liptak, Tate, Flatt, Oakley & Lingler (2014) report that in social interactions between older 
adults with cognitive impairment and their caregivers the most pervasive type of humor was sarcasm or 
dry wit. The use of sarcasm was often affectionate and was argued to provide a release of tension. 
Exploring age differences in the use of sarcasm in interpersonal interaction with close friends or family 
could indicate whether shared affectionate humor might have a positive function. 
Cultural differences may also be important. In the UK sarcasm has been a staple of humor for 
many decades, and it has been argued that behavior which would be seen as aggressive or denigrating 
in the US would be seen as funny in the UK (Vernon, Martin, Aitken Schermer, Cherkas & Spector, 2008). 
Indeed Vernon et al. point out that the North American version of ‘The Office’ depicted a character 
more sensitive and tolerant than his UK counterpart. In Scotland, where the current research was 
carried out, much humor is traditionally based on irony and mockery (Francesconi, 2011), and this often 
takes the form of affectionate but sarcastic comments. In North American samples older adults are less 
likely to endorse aggressive humor than young, and this mediates age differences in perceived 
appropriateness of social behavior (Stanley et al., 2014): but it is not clear if this would apply to a UK 
sample. While there is no direct evidence on cultural differences in reaction to sarcasm in older adults, 
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there is relevant evidence for children. Canadian and Czech children react very differently to sarcastic 
praise, probably because there is differential use of sarcastic praise in everyday speech (Filippova, 2014).  
Also, Iranian children show greater understanding of sarcasm than age-matched Australian children 
(Shahaeian, Nielsen, Peterson & Slaughter, 2014).  The current results could therefore be influenced by 
cultural effects: this should be explored in future through data collection in multiple cultures.  
Directions for future research 
Future research should explore whether there are age differences in the frequency of 
encountering and using sarcasm in everyday life, and how this relates to more generally cynical 
attitudes, positivity biases, and indicators of cognitive and social skills. Channon et al. (2005) describe a 
rating scale to assess participants’ likelihood of being sarcastic in different situations – whereas it might 
be appropriate to use affectionate sarcasm with a family member, it would be less appropriate in a 
more formal situation such as a job interview.  It would also be interesting to carry out linguistic 
analyses of social interactions or existing prose written by authors of different ages. Generational 
differences could be explored by looking at examples of sarcastic humor (cartoons, radio or TV 
programs) from different decades. In the current study the age of the people in the stories/videos was 
not controlled, and given evidence of own-age biases in response to some social stimuli (e.g. Slessor, 
Phillips, Ruffman, Bailey & Insch, 2014) it would be useful to explore this issue in future studies. 
However,  an own-age advantage in social perception is not seen in all tasks: for example, in identifying 
emotions from older faces (e.g. Ebner, He & Johnson, 2011): instead older faces are more difficult to 
interpret for young and older participants (Fölster, Hess & Werheid, 2014). 
In the last decade there has been increasing evidence that adult aging can impair both relatively 
simple tasks of social perception (e.g. following eye gaze, see Phillips et al., 2014 for a review) and more 
complex measures of social reasoning (e.g. false belief understanding, see Henry et al., 2013 for a 
review). However, some aspects of social understanding may improve across the lifespan, such as 
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interpreting videos of smiles (Murphy, Lehrfeld & Isaacowitz, 2010), and empathy (Richter & Kunzmann, 
2011). In order to develop a more detailed theoretical model of what might underlie age differences in a 
range of social skills, it would be valuable to have larger scale studies which include a range of social 
perception and social understanding tasks, as well as more detailed measures of cognition. However 
there is not an overarching model of these social cognitive processes to aid appropriate selection of 
tasks. While there have been important distinctions made between hot and cold aspects of social 
cognition (e.g. Shamay-Tsoory  &  Aharon-Peretz, 2007), modality of presentation of stimuli such as 
verbal versus visual (Slessor et al., 2007), and implicit versus explicit measures (Bailey & Henry, 2009) it 
is not clear which of these dimensions are most important to consider when assessing age differences.  
Given the evidence of non-linear age effects, it would be particularly useful to learn more about 
the performance of middle-aged people in relation to younger and older adults, as well as more about 
how the oldest old perform on these tasks. It is important to understand more about the influence of 
aging on social cognition tasks such as sarcasm comprehension, because failures to understand others’ 
intentions could cause misunderstandings in social interaction. There is evidence that problems with 
decoding sarcasm can predict poorer social interaction skills in a group of patients with brain injury 
(McDonald, Flanagan, Martin, & Saunders, 2004). Future studies should address whether age differences 
in interpreting non-literal statements such as sarcasm influence intergenerational communication. Age 
differences in the nuanced interpretation of meaning could impede shared understanding. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the current research indicates that older adults have problems in decoding different 
types of sarcasm from both written and video formats. These age effects were specific, as indicated by 
the lack of age effect on matched control tasks. Mediation analyses indicated that difficulties with 
emotion perception may contribute to these age effects. Older adults may be prone to more literal 
interpretation of sarcastic statements, with possible consequences for social interactions.  
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Table 1:  
Descriptive statistics for age group differences in background variables.  
 Young Middle-aged Old 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Age 25.24 5.74 53.40 8.25 73.86 5.40 
Education (years) 15.88 3.44 16.76 4.01 13.65 4.21 
Vocabulary 18.23 4.34 23.40 4.05 22.89 4.42 
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Table 2:  
Descriptive statistics for age group differences in potential mediator variables and correlations with 
sarcasm tasks.  
 Young Middle-aged Old Correlation with 
sarcasm task: 
 M SD M SD M SD Video Story 
EP 79.17 9.46 80.85 7.01 73.28 9.30 .379 ** .185 * 
ToM 73.71 11.67 75.72 8.58 70.73 9.99 .210 * .304 ** 
2-back 96.57 5.58 92.52 8.48 90.50 8.29 .161 .188 † 
PANAS-N 7.05 3.29 6.20 2.35 4.23 2.41 .112 .099 
PANAS-P 13.91 4.74 10.63 4.12 14.10 6.45 .073 .011 
 
EP = emotion perception, ToM = theory of mind, PANAS-N and PANAS-P = negative affect and 
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Figure 1: Effects of age and video type on the percentage accuracy of understanding sincere, simple 
sarcastic and paradoxical sarcastic exchanges. Error bars are 1 SE of the mean. Y = young, M = middle-
aged, O = old. 
 
Figure 2: Effects of age and story type (MC = mental control, PC = physical control, DS = direct sarcasm, 
IS = indirect sarcasm) on accuracy of understanding of story material. Errors bars are 1 SE of the mean. Y 
= young, M = middle-aged, O = old. 
 
Figure 3: Path diagrams of mediation analyses examining facial emotion perception (EP) as a possible 
mediator of age differences in sarcasm comprehension from (i) videos and (ii) stories. The numbers are 
uncorrected path coefficients as recommended in Preacher and Hayes (2008). The coefficients above 
the pathway between age and sarcasm comprehension (c) are direct effects, while the bold figure in 
each case (c’) is the age effect on sarcasm comprehension once emotion perception is included as a 
mediator in the model. The significance of the mediation effect is determined by a bootstrapping 
procedure, see text for results. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Figure 4:  Path diagrams of mediation analyses examining working memory (WM) as a possible mediator 
of age differences in sarcasm comprehension from stories. The numbers are uncorrected path 
coefficients as recommended in Preacher and Hayes (2008). The coefficient above the pathway between 
age and sarcasm comprehension (c) is the direct effect, while the bold figure (c’) is the age effect on 
sarcasm comprehension once WM is included as a mediator. Note that n = 102 for this analysis. * p < 
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a = -3.025 ** 
 
b = 0.407  *** 
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c’ = -3.755 *** 
c = -3.780 *** 
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Appendix 1: Examples of stories from the sarcasm task. 
Example of physical control story 
Stephen's washing machine was broken.  He hand-washed his black shirt and put it to dry on his 
balcony. It was summertime, and very hot and sunny. The shirt stayed on the balcony in the sunlight. 
Several days later he carried it indoors. The front was several shades lighter than the back. His mum 
said: “I did say you should have brought it in sooner!”  
Why was the front lighter than the back?  
1. It had been on the balcony. 
2. The sunlight faded the colour on the front. 
3. He had washed it by hand.  
4. It had been raining.  
 
Example of mental control story 
Harriet thought she was overweight and was on a diet. She decided to go swimming early one morning.  
The pool was empty, and she started swimming. She swam one length of the pool. Suddenly, a group of 
teenage boys appeared. Harriet got out and left the swimming pool. 
Why did Harriet leave the pool?  
1. She thought it was too early in the morning. 
2. She did not want to swim any longer.  
3. She wanted everyone to look at her. 
4. She did not want the boys to look at her. 
 
Example of direct sarcasm story 
Vicky had bought tickets for a new play at the theatre. One was for herself and the other for her friend 
Jean. Vicky said the play would be good. The play turned out to be terrible. They were both 
disappointed.  Jean said: “That was a fantastic play you took me to see!” 
What did Jean mean when she said that? 
1. That play was terrible. 
2. That was a very good play. 
3. Next time I'll check what the critics say. 
4. That was a beautiful theatre. 
 
Example of indirect sarcasm story 
One Wednesday evening Rob and his wife had a dinner party. Around midnight everyone was tired, and 
the guests started to leave. One man stayed and kept on talking. He finally left at four in the morning. 
He said that he hoped he had not stayed too long. Rob said: “We'll get at least two hours sleep before 
work tomorrow!” 
What did the Rob mean when he said that? 
1. We’ll be able to sleep for two hours.  
2. We won't get two hours sleep.  
3. You did stay rather late.  
4. I’ll never invite you again.  
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